B. Scotus’ own Response

12. A treatment of this question is contained at length in Ord. I d.3 nn.340-345, II d.3 nn.355-363.

Hence, from the things proved there [ibid. I d.3 nn.348-378, II d.3 nn.388-394], let there be supposed here: first that an intelligible species is to be posited; second that it remains in the intellect when all act of understanding ceases - nor does it remain only as suddenly passing away, but as possessed under some idea of permanence. But whether it is a habit was touched on there, that when speaking of habit in the sense of some quality inclining to ease of consideration a species is not a habit but precedes it; indeed, it precedes the act by which the habit properly speaking is generated [ibid. I. d.3 n.378, II d.3 nn.378-387].

13. Now how Augustine and Avicenna [n.10] are to be expounded is plain there, because Augustine speaks only of the sensitive faculty that he calls the ‘faculty of cogitation’ [On the Trinity 15.22 n.42], and which will not remain in the separated soul [Ord. I d.3 n.393]. But Avicenna seems to posit a double mode of understanding: by an inferior and by a superior, as is said there [cf. Scotus, Rep. IA d.3 nn.236-238], and knowledge by the inferior indeed abides but not knowledge by the superior.

14. From these suppositions we get this conclusion, that there remains in the intellect in itself, after the act of understanding, an intelligible species.

15. From this the argument goes: in the intellect, as it is subject of the intelligible species, there is not requisite, not even necessarily requisite, a union of it with the body; therefore, when not united with the body, it is not differently disposed as to receiving the intelligible species.

The consequence is plain, because a subject is not differently disposed to receiving something because of variation in what is not the reason for receiving it, nor in any way necessary for receiving it.

I prove the antecedent, because the species is a form simply immaterial or spiritual, at least in that it is not extended and not extendable. Hence the Commentator [Averroes] says [On the Soul III com.18] that the object is transferred from order to order when it is transferred by the agent intellect from the phantasm to the order of the possible intellect [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.359], which I understand only to mean from the order of the material and extendable to the order of the immaterial and non-extendable. But nothing simply immaterial is received in the intellect insofar as the intellect is simply united with the body, because if this were so, it would be received either in the whole first, or union with the body will be a reason for the receiving; whether in this way or that, the thing received will not be thus altogether immaterial.

16. From this I get that the intelligible species can inform the separated and united intellect in the same way. And then further: since the intelligible species, joined with the agent and possible intellects, constitutes in the same way the idea of perfect memory (in the way said elsewhere about intellective memory, that it contains intelligible object and generative intellect [Ord. I d.3 nn.375, 395]) - it follows that a memory of the same idea will be able to exist in the separated intellect as existed in the united intellect; and further, since an equally perfect memory is equally parent of a perfect act in the intelligence, it follows that this sort of generating will be equally able to be present in the separated intellect as in the united intellect. Therefore, the separated soul will be able, by a retained intelligible species, to have actual intellection of anything that it was capable of having intellection of before.

17. With this agrees the intention of the Philosopher, who maintains, On the Soul 1.1.403a3-10, that if the soul cannot have an operation when it is separated, neither can it exist separated. He also puts knowledge properly in the intellect, On the Soul 3.8.431b21-23, saying that “just as the soul is made sensible through the senses, so is it made knowable through knowledge.” Now science is, on its own part, of a nature to abide incorruptibly, and consequently on the part of the subject too, since the subject is incorruptible. But what has science is in accidental potency to actual consideration, from ibid. 3.4.429b31-30a2, Physics 8.4.255a30-b5. Therefore, the separated soul is in accidental potency to understanding objects habitually known to it; therefore it can by itself proceed to act.

18. With this agrees also the statement of Jerome in his prologue to the Bible [Epistle 53 to Paulinus n.9], “Let us learn on earth things the knowledge of which will remain with us in heaven.” For it would be very unfitting to labor so much over science and truths if they ceased to exist in death, and very irrational that they should remain without being able to be actualized.